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In August 2017, sociologist of science and technology 
Joanna Latimer wrote an online essay that reflected on 
the ethical implications of an encounter with a particular 
animal, which had resulted in violence. Staying in a 
small hotel in Crete for a conference, Latimer went for 
an evening walk, passing through scenic countryside. 
On reaching an industrial area, she turned back to the 
hotel but was attacked by a dog guarding some nearby 
sheds. Latimer viscerally describes the moment of the 
attack, detailing how the dog tore and ripped her leg, 
her hand, and the arm she raised to prevent the animal 
from reaching her throat. At a critical juncture in the 
attack, however, Latimer describes how:
Everything slowed down – and I said to myself 
“Joanna, you know about dogs”; and I said “Shsh, 
shsh” to the dog at the same time as I went very still 
and quiet. The dog sensed the change, and looked up 
at me, and I took my chance, pushed away along the 
ground, away from the limit of the dog’s chain’s reach.
Conceptualising the significance of this moment, 
Latimer suggests that it marked a passing of 
thresholds: from being entangled with the dog in a 
way that rendered her vulnerable to attack, to their 
bodies becoming re-entangled in a slightly different 
manner that created a moment of calm. This shift 
ultimately enabled Latimer to disentangle herself from 
the encounter entirely, likely saving her life. These very 
different entanglements with an animal also carry 
different ethical implications, with no option entirely 
free of violence. While initially violence was directed 
toward Latimer’s own body, ultimately, she points out, 
it was the dog who was rendered vulnerable (with their 
owner pressured to euthanize them). 
***
Latimer’s reflections speak in complicated ways to a 
body of cultural theory that has found ethical potential 
in entanglements between humans and animals. 
Entanglement here means something more than 
simply being in relationships with animals. Instead 
it refers to the mutually transformative dimension 
of these relationships. Influential thinkers such as 
Donna Haraway have elucidated this line of argument 
by turning to dogs. For Haraway, what it means 
to be both canine and human has fundamentally 





by Eva Haifa Giraud
Keele University
From The Philosopher, vol. 108, no. 1 
For more articles or to subscribe: 
thephilosopher1923.org
52
occurred, for instance, in processes 
of domestication). In books 
such as The Companion Species 
Manifesto, moreover, she describes 
transformative entanglements 
with dogs that occur on a more 
everyday basis, ranging from 
physical exchanges (as when saliva 
and microbes are passed between 
bodies through overly-enthusiastic 
acts of face-licking) to emotional 
shifts that occur as humans and 
animals co-habit and become 
attuned to one another’s needs.  
The ethical value of such 
entanglements is beautifully 
articulated by Lori Gruen in this 
issue. As Gruen argues, an ethics of 
entanglement offers scope to “move 
us toward more conscientious 
ethical reflection and engagement”, 
overcoming the limitations of 
rights-based frameworks that 
have conventionally dominated 
discussions of animal ethics. These 
arguments speak to work that has 
been published over the past two 
decades by thinkers such as Karen 
Barad and Vinciane Despret, in 
addition to Haraway, who have 
likewise argued for the value of 
an ethics of entanglement as 
opposed to rights-based models 
of ethics. The work of each of 
these theorists is full of vivid 
descriptions of instances where 
bodily entanglements with 
animals have fostered new forms 
of understanding, care, and ethical 
responsibility that improve these 
relationships (echoing Gruen’s 
arguments). 
Latimer’s description of her own, 
violent, encounter with an animal 
builds directly on entanglement 
ethics and engages sympathetically 
with this body of thought. At the 
same time, her essay (and indeed 
Latimer’s work more broadly) 
offers complications. What Latimer 
highlights is that in some instances 
finding space to create distance 
between human and animal bodies 
is just as ethically significant as 
entanglement; her essay, I suggest, 
opens three different lines of 
question in this regard. Firstly, 
Latimer’s experiences foreground 
that relations with other animals 
are not always desirable, and 
that sometimes the survival of 
particular creatures requires 
disentangling from other species. 
Secondly, and relatedly, she 
elucidates that even more convivial 
bodily entanglements can result in 
violence or even death. Thirdly, and 
perhaps most significantly, Latimer 
underlines that decisions about 
which entangled relationships 
should be pushed for are always 
political, entailing decisions about 
whose needs, desires, and ways of 
being should be prioritised over 
others. Below I discuss the ethical 
implications of each of these issues, 
drawing on three – very different 
– examples from work I have 
engaged in (individually and with 
colleagues). 
***
As Gruen describes, bodily 
entanglements between humans 
and animals can foster ethical 
responsibility in ways that have 
a profound effect on behaviour. 
What happens, however, when 
the animals in question are less 
easy to be entangled with? In an 
essay entitled “Flourishing with 
Awkward Creatures”, for instance, 
Franklin Ginn, Uli Beisel and Maan 
Barua explore the possibilities (and 
challenges) for flourishing with 
“animal others that disgust us, 
animals that we do not (like to) see 
or touch, and with whom we do not 
want to be together”. In my own 
work with Eleanor Hadley Kershaw, 
Richard Helliwell and Greg Hollin, 
we address this question in relation 
to three lifeforms that have thrived 
over recent years (to the discomfort 
of many humans and other animals 
forced to live with them): bed bugs, 
anti-microbial resistant (AMR) 
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Entanglements with each of these 
lifeforms carry different stakes: 
bed bugs are annoying, but also 
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carry stigma that often falls along 
classed and racialized lines (having 
historically and often erroneously 
been connected to poverty, 
uncleanliness and and migration). 
With AMR the stakes are still 
higher, as it poses a threat to life 
and – though resistant microbes 
do not discriminate in the bodies 
they can affect – resistance is 
more difficult to contain in regions 
with poor health infrastructure. 
The desirability of entanglement 
with hookworms is, in contrast, 
highly situated. In tropical and 
sub-tropical regions the parasites 
often remain pathological. 
However, in the Western Europe 
and North America it is the loss 
of such parasites that has been 
pathologised. Overly clean living 
conditions have been associated 
with a range of autoimmune 
diseases, resulting in a growing 
use of helminthic therapies – 
where hookworms are deliberately 
introduced into human bodies 
– to treat diseases including 
asthma, coeliac disease, and 
multiple sclerosis. These examples 
illustrate that in some instances 
creating distance or even excluding 
particular relationships between 
humans and other species can 
be necessary. Preventing certain 
entanglements might be especially 
important in contexts where the 
burden of who has the capacity to 
deal with “awkward creatures” falls 
unevenly and reinforces classed 
and racialized inequalities. 
Hookworms, bed bugs and 
AMR, however, also show that 
decisions about when, how, and 
whether to create distance with 
particular creatures are not easy. 
The contemporary flourishing of 
these lifeforms is often connected 
with failed historical attempts 
to eliminate them, as with AMR 
and bed bugs that have become 
resistant to drugs and chemicals. 
Elimination attempts can also 
have disastrous ecological 
implications; the chemical of 
choice for eliminating bed bugs in 
the mid-20th century, for instance, 
was DDT (the consequences of 
which have been well-documented, 
most famously in Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring). And, as we have 
seen, excluding certain lifeforms 
from human lives can also have 
unexpected side-effects, as with the 
connections being drawn between a 
lack of entanglement with parasites 
and autoimmune diseases.   
Understanding when it is necessary 
to disentangle from other species, 
how to disentangle without 
causing further ecological and 
social damage, and, importantly, 
extending the agency to make 
such choices to those affected the 
most, is something that requires 
sustained ethical consideration. 
More fundamentally, questions 
need to be asked about what 
sort of ethical framework can be 
used to foster care for the more-
than-human world when direct 
entanglements are dangerous or 
even impossible.   
***
It is not, however, just a matter of 
addressing questions about how to 
navigate relationships with species 
that are damaging to humans. In 
all-too-many contexts it is humans 
themselves who are doing the 
damage. One of the most striking 
aspects of Latimer’s essay is that – 
despite the act of calming the dog 
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saving her own life – she does not use this rationale 
to frame her actions as entirely innocent. Instead, she 
emphasises that shifting her relationship with the dog 
from violence to something more convivial had very 
negative consequences for the animal.  
DECISIONS ABOUT WHEN, 
HOW, AND WHETHER TO 
CREATE DISTANCE WITH 
PARTICULAR CREATURES ARE 
NOT EASY
In my collaborative work with Greg Hollin we have, 
similarly, traced less innocent dimensions of human-
animal entanglements, focusing on an example 
where entanglements between humans and animals 
have been instrumentalised more systematically: 
laboratory beagles. The project emerged after the 
two of us had a discussion during which I mentioned 
that I felt uncomfortable with some of the arguments 
being made by influential thinkers such as Haraway 
(whose work I had otherwise found so valuable). In 
her 2008 book When Species Meet, Haraway argues 
that ethical responsibility and care can emerge in 
animal laboratories if space is created for close, bodily 
entanglements between researchers, technicians and 
animals. Through these bodily relations, she suggests 
that it is possible to develop a felt understanding of 
whether animals are happy, distressed, or signifying 
resistance, which could encourage people to alter the 
environment to improve their conditions.  
The reason I mentioned feeling discomfort at this 
argument – aside from any personal differences in 
ideological viewpoint – can be elucidated by turning to 
the longer history of dogs’ use as experimental animals. 
One of the reasons that beagles became the laboratory 
breed of choice was because of their capacity to enter 
into convivial relationships with humans. In the first 
large-scale beagle colony at the University of California 
Davis (1951-1986), funded by the Manhattan Project, 
a large amount of space was created for people to spend 
time with beagles, learn about their needs, and be 
affected by the dogs emotionally. Insights gained from 
these encounters were used to re-reshape the research 
environment; everything from cage design, to how long 
carers spent with animals, and even the type of gravel 
used, was changed in response to what appeared to 
make the beagles happier and more contented.
On the one hand, therefore, the Davis colony seems to 
reflect Haraway’s argument that responsibility and care 
emerging through bodily entanglements with animals 
can generate relationships that are more beneficial to 
the animals themselves. What should not be forgotten, 
however, is the overarching context: here, improving 
these relationships is also what enabled the animals 
to be instrumentalised more easily. The happier the 
beagle, the less likely they were to disrupt the aims 
of the experiment. Eventually it got to the point 
that researchers didn’t even need leads when they 
were weighing and measuring beagles for radiation 
experiments. Over time, by using bodily entanglements 
with beagles to gain insight into the dogs’ requirements, 
behaviours that could disrupt experimental work were 
gradually eliminated while personality traits that 
made beagles amenable to laboratory research were 
enhanced. 
As Hollin and I argued, these processes have implications 
beyond simply suggesting that entanglements between 
humans and animals can – in some instances – be 
instrumentalised. Here, the historical exclusion of 
certain disruptive relationships between beagles and 
humans had long-term ramifications, by shaping 
and potentially limiting the transformative effects 
that could emerge from subsequent human-animal 
entanglements. This case, therefore, poses questions 
about whether an ethics of entanglement could 
have limitations in contexts where relationships 
between humans and animals have already been 
instrumentalised.  
***
So far I have pointed to two instances of less positive 
entanglements between humans and animals: in 
the first instance entanglements are potentially 
harmful to humans, while in the second they hold 
negative implications for animals. Both cases suggest 
that certain entanglements might undermine other 
possibilities, especially if they lead to violence for one 
(or both) of the parties involved. In some instances, 
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then, particular entanglements might need to be 
excluded, avoided, or even contested, in order to allow 
other realities to come into being. The act of excluding 
one set of entangled relations in favour of another, 
however, is always political, an assertion that resonates 
with the third issue posed by Latimer’s work. It is this 
politics of exclusion that is the focus of my recent book 
What Comes After Entanglement? 
Exclusion has played an important role for certain 
thinkers associated with this body of theory, albeit one 
overshadowed by an emphasis on entanglement and 
coming together. Barad’s influential work, for instance, 
argues that as certain courses of action are deployed or 
as particular relations and ways of being emerge in the 
world, this necessarily comes at the expense of other 
realities. Exclusion, moreover, should not just be seen 
as something that happens, the flip-side of a dynamic, 
evolving world where some relations are always 
emerging at the expense of others. What I argue in my 
book is that exclusion needs to be seen as something 
that demands political and ethical attention. 
THE ACT OF EXCLUDING ONE 
SET OF ENTANGLED RELATIONS 
IN FAVOUR OF ANOTHER, 
HOWEVER, IS ALWAYS 
POLITICAL
A small body of work concerned with entanglements 
between humans and non-humans has elucidated 
some of these stakes: From the visceral description of 
interactions between humans and dogs in Latimer’s 
work, to Thom van Dooren’s discussion of how 
particular environmental relations have forced entire 
species of birds onto the “dull edge of extinction”, or 
from Rosemary Collard’s research about the global 
wildlife trade, to Franklin Ginn’s focus on human-
plant-slug relationships (see Jonathon Turnbull and 
Adam Searle’s column on the new materialisms in the 
previous issue of this journal). Van Dooren’s work, 
for instance, elucidates the urgency of intervening in 
problems such as plastic waste in the first chapter of 
Flight Ways, where he describes fledgling albatrosses 
slowly starving as their stomachs fill with plastic 
instead of fish. Here it is a lack of intervention – or, put 
differently, a failure to exclude certain relationships 
between humans and animals – that is likely to unravel 
whole ways of life, not only of albatrosses but other 
species whose lives are knotted together with the birds. 
My book is concerned with the messy practicalities of 
dealing with this ethics of entanglement and exclusion 
in (activist) practice. One of the cases I look at, for 
instance, is vegan politics. In turning to veganism I was 
not suggesting that it should be treated in an uncritical 
and unreflexive way; as important work within vegan 
scholarship by thinkers such as A. Breeze Harper and 
Richard White illustrates, certain strands of popular 
veganism have unthinkingly reproduced other social 
inequalities. As Harper puts it in her 2010 article 
in the Journal of Critical Animal Studies, uncritical 
use of labels such as “cruelty free” are misnomers 
when violence and inequality exists at every level in 
globalized food systems. What White terms consumer 
“lifestyle veganism”, moreover, can do little to redress 
these inequalities and sometimes perpetuates them 
(especially if veganism just becomes a new market that 
can be captured by fast food chains selling plant-based 
foods). While acknowledging these tensions, what I 
do seek to unpick in the book are external criticisms 
levelled at veganism, which tend to homogenise and 
even mischaracterise vegan politics, for example by 
framing vegan ethics as intrinsically problematic 
due to shutting down particular ways of relating to 
animals. Haraway, for instance, portrays veganism as 
a denial that no way of living avoids killing and, more 
recently, Elspeth Probyn has argued that it marks an 
active “opting out of the structural complexities of food 
provisioning, production, and consumption”.  
In my work I tried to complicate such narratives by 
elucidating how veganism has, in practice, functioned 
instead as an opting-in to the complexity of eating. In 
contexts where decisions to exclude certain relations – 
here certain ways of organising food production – might 
be important in challenging inequalities, avoiding 
harm, or even a matter of life and death, finding ways 
to assume responsibility for the world that is brought 
into being through a given course of action is critically 
important. As I discuss in my book, certain instances 
of vegan food activism (such as the transnational Food 
Not Bombs movement and free food give-aways in the 
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context of fast food activism in the UK), have sought 
to highlight and contest existing ways of producing, 
distributing, and disposing of food in specific contexts. 
FINDING WAYS TO ASSUME 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 
WORLD THAT IS BROUGHT 
INTO BEING THROUGH A 
GIVEN COURSE OF ACTION IS 
CRITICALLY IMPORTANT
These groups draw criticisms of animal agriculture 
together with critiques of food poverty, inequality and 
food waste. A guiding principle is that it is important 
to highlight exclusions and inequalities – for both 
human and non-human animals – that already exist 
in certain food systems. These existing exclusions are 
so normative that they are difficult to detect without 
alternative approaches that seek to contest them and, 
in doing so, prevent these norms from simply being 
treated as “the way things are”. Food Not Bombs, for 
instance, share food made from vegetarian ingredients 
that is due to be discarded as waste with homeless 
people in public space. By occupying the city in this 
way, the group draw attention to food waste and food 
poverty, as well as animal ethics. In addition, these 
actions contest both the corporatisation of public space 
(by distributing food for free) and the criminalisation 
of homelessness (by combating no-loitering laws). Here 
the desire to re-work or challenge particular aspects of 
food systems plays an important role in politicising 
existing exclusions that often go under the radar, 
creating space to ask whether particular ways of doing 
things could be done “otherwise”. 
***
What I have tried to outline above, then, is that despite 
the important work that has been accomplished for 
entanglement ethics, there are some issues associated 
with this approach that need to be thought through. 
Namely, that it is important for an ethics that centres 
entanglements with animals to also reflect upon 
questions about which relationships with animals 
might need to be carefully re-negotiated, contested or 
even excluded. The “ethics of exclusion” that I discuss 
in my book is not suggesting that excluding particular 
relationships between humans and animals is 
necessarily a “good” thing that should be championed. 
As evident from the above examples, exclusions 
can obviously have problematic ramifications. I do, 
however, reiterate the point that every course of action 
carries an attendant exclusion: as brought home starkly 
in Latimer’s example. What is important, therefore, is 
paying close attention to who or what is being excluded 
in the process of other entangled relations coming 
into being, due to the high political and ethical stakes 
attached to any form of exclusion.
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